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Abstract- Cloud computing is causing a major shift in the IT 
industry. Research indicates that the cloud computing industry 
segment is substantial and growing enormously. New 
technologies have been developed, and now there are various 
ways to virtualize IT systems and to access the needed 
applications on the Internet, through web based applications. 
Users, now can access their data any time and at any place 
with the service provided by the cloud storage. With all these 
benefits, security is always a concern. Even though the cloud 
provides accessing the data stored in cloud storage in a 
flexible and scalable manner, the main challenge it faces is 
with the security issues. Thus user may think it’s not secure 
since the encryption keys are managed by the software, 
therefore there is no attestation on the client software integrity. 
The cloud user who has to deploy in the reliable and secure 
environment should be confirmed from the Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS) that it has not been corrupted by the 
mischievous acts. Thus, the user identification which consists 
user ID and password can also be easily compromised. Apart 
from the traditional network security solutions, trusted 
computing technology is combined into more and more 
aspects of cloud computing environment to guarantee the 
integrity of platform and provide attestation mechanism for 
trustworthy services. Thus, enhancing the confidence of the 
IaaS provider. A cryptographic protocol adopted by the 
Trusted Computing Group enables the remote authentication 
which preserves the privacy of the user based on the trusted 
platform. Thus we propose a framework which defines Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM), a trusted computing group which 
proves the secure data access control in the cloud storage by 
providing additional security. In this paper, we define the TPM-
based key management, remote client attestation and a 
secure key share protocol across multiple users. Then we 
consider some of the challenges with the current TPM based 
attestation techniques. Thus, proposing a potable TPM which 
is not embedded into the virtual machines so as to provide the 
efficiency to the cloud users. Using this approach, security of 
the user is handled in an efficient way. Finally, we demonstrate 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed schemes 
through extensive experimental evaluation on the live Microsoft 
Windows Azure platform. 
Keywords: TPM, IaaS, vTPM, cTPM, SMRR, SMM,TCG, 
TED, DRTM, VLR, DRTM, CA. 
I. Introduction 
LOUD computing is undoubtedly the new era of 
computing. Industry experts believe that notion of 
perceiving cloud  computing as a new technology   
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trend, is all set to grow. Cost factor is the biggest driver 
for its expected growth. According to Gartner Inc. Cloud 
computing is a disruptive phenomenon, with the 
potential to make IT organizations more responsive than 
ever. Cloud computing promises economic advantages, 
speed, agility, flexibility, infinite elasticity and innovation. 
Cloud computing is an internet-based facility to share 
technological resources, software and digital 
information. This technological methodology can save a 
lot of infrastructure cost and pay-as-you-use model can 
also be offered through the cloud computing solutions. 
The above mentioned utilities can help small and mid-
sized companies to bring down their operational costs. 
IDC India lead analyst (software and services research), 
Kamal Vohra stated, “The most attractive feature of this 
new technology is the prospect of converting large, 
upfront capital investments in IT infrastructure into 
smaller, manageable ‘pay-per-use’ annuity payments.” 
Recent IDC cloud research shows that spending on 
public IT cloud services will reach $58.4 billion in 2015 
and is expected to be more than $107 billion in 2017. 
Over the 2013–2017 forecast period, public IT cloud 
services will have a compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of 23.5%, five times that of the industry overall. 
Software as a service (SaaS) will remain the largest 
public IT cloud services category, capturing 59.7% of 
revenues in 2017. IDC predicts that by 2017, 80%+ of 
new cloud apps will be hosted on six PaaS platforms. 
Armonk, N.Y.  May 2014 announced businesses across 
the US have ranked IBM the number 1 cloud computing 
provider, according to an IDC survey of US market 
preferences for infrastructure - as - a - service (IaaS). 
Enterprises ranked Amazon 7th, behind Google (5th) 
and Microsoft (6th). The rankings are based on 
responses from more than 400 US-based companies. 
Privacy and security is the main concern in the 
communication over a network. Continuous work to 
ensure the privacy and confidentiality of the data 
communication have existed for a long time. Cloud 
computing is the future but not if security problems 
persist. The major concern that are being trying to 
recognize is mainly on the security issues over the cloud 
computing. However, security and privacy are still cited 
by many organisations as the top inhibitors of cloud 
services adoption. FaraziSabhaiet. al. [2] describes the 
well-known Gartner's seven security issues. The basic 
security issues such as Data leakage, DoS (Denial of 
Service) attacks are addressed.  
C 
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Cloud computing services fall into three major 
categories- Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform 
as a Service (PaaS) and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). 
The software applications which are deployed from the 
cloud infrastructure provided by the cloud providers are 
accessed by the Software-as-a-Service (SaaS).The 
cloud providers manage and control the application so 
that the user does not need to own the software but 
rather pay for its use through a web API. Platform as a 
Service (PaaS) lets the users deploy their applications 
on the provider’s cloud infrastructure using 
programming languages and tools supported by the 
provider. Finally, Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
authorizes the deployment and the execution of an 
environment fully controlled by the user, typically a 
Virtual Machine (VM) – on the Cloud resources. 
Typically, the user should purchase the infrastructure 
such as software, data resource, server, network 
accessories in order to operate. But here, the user can 
directly purchase all these resources as outsourced 
services from directly from the cloud on “pay-as-you-
use” basis. Thus, providing efficiency. Here, we focus 
on the security aspects of the third category of cloud 
services, i.e., IaaS platforms and more precisely on 
conﬁdentiality and integrity issues. The problem arises 
when the user has to preserve the data confidential on 
the shared platform. Also, care must be taken that once 
deployed, the integrity of the environment is not 
corrupted by the mischievous acts. 
A novel approach to protect IaaS platforms that 
confide on the approach established from the Trusted 
Computing Group (TCG) whichoffer a secured and 
reassuring environment with the hardware device called 
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). TPM designates 
both the name of a speciﬁcation detailing a secure 
crypto processor as well as the implementation of that 
speciﬁcation, often called the TPM chip. TPM asserts 
the virtue of remote authentication and gets interacted 
with the symmetric key which can be used for various 
cryptographic purposes, from the protection of network 
communications to data encryption. In the IaaS context, 
it ensures that only the remote resource with which the 
user is communicating using the TCG protocol can 
interact with the ciphered data. 
Zhidong et. al. [6] address the cloud computing 
security challenges by proposing a solution called the 
Trusted Computing Platform (TCP). Trusted cloud 
computing system is built using TCP as the hardware for 
cloud computing and it ensures privacy and trust. By 
design, TPMs offer a hardware root of trust bound to a 
single, standalone device. TPMs come equipped with 
encryption keys whose private parts never leave the 
TPM hardware chip, reducing the possibility those keys 
may be compromised. Assessing security protocols 
requires more than showing their robustness against a 
few use cases. Recent advances in automatic protocol 
analysis tools [4] allow to scale up the attack complexity 
against the analyzed protocol and detect design errors.  
A TPM is a small tamper proof hardware chip 
embedded in most recent motherboards. This paper 
presents TPM with the portability, an extension of the 
TCG’s model which possess an additional secret key to 
the TPM and shares the secret key with the cloud. 
Therefore, with this, the cloud can create and share the 
secret keys of TPM and data over multiple platforms 
which belongs to a single user. 
The research mechanism is organized as 
follows. Section two discusses the related work. Our 
proposed work is discussed in section three. The 
experimental results and comparisons are presented in 
section four. Section four proves the experimental 
results of our proposed system. The concluding remarks 
are discussed in the last section of the paper. 
II. Related Work 
 Much work has been done in concern with 
security issues in Cloud Computing sector. Let us look 
into some of the survey which exists. [1] presentsc TPM, 
an extension of the TPM’s design that adds an 
additional root key to the TPM and shares that root key 
with the cloud. As a result, the cloud can create and 
share TPM-protected keys and data across multiple 
devices owned by one user. Further, the additional key 
lets the cTPM allocate cloud-backed remote storage so 
that each TPM can beneﬁt from a trusted real-time clock 
and high performance, non-volatile storage. This paper 
shows that cTPM is practical, versatile, and easily 
applicable to trusted mobile applications. By avoiding a 
clean-slate redesign, we sidestep the difﬁcult challenge 
of re-verifying the security properties of a new TPM 
design. Here it demonstrates cTPM’s versatility with two 
case studies: extending Pasture with additional 
functionality, and re-implementing TrInc without the 
need for extra hardware. Re-implementing TrInc without 
the need for extra hardware again causes with the core 
security issues.  
The paper [3] present a novel secure auditing 
scheme for cloud computing systems. One major 
problem with auditing schemes is that they are 
vulnerable to the transient attack (also known as the 
timed scrubbing attack). This secure auditing scheme is 
able to prevent the transient attack via modification of 
the Linux auditing daemon - audit, which creates 
attestable logs. This scheme utilizes the System 
Management Mode (SMM) for integrity checks and the 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip for attestable 
security. Specifically, it modifies the auditing daemon 
protocol such that it records a hash of eachaudit log 
entry to the TPM's Platform Configuration Register 
(PCR), which gives an attestable history of every 
command executed on the cloud server. Different from 
the existing auditing schemes, this scheme is capable of 
© 2015   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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Portable Tpm Based User Attestation Architecture for Cloud Environments
preventing the transient attack. It has achieved this by 
modifying the existing Linux auditing daemon as well as 
making use of existing software and hardware. This 
scheme can provide clients with greater assurance and 
trust in cloud computing services. System with Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) [14] provides secure boot via 
the Core Root of Trust for Measurement as well as 
secure storage for the log file hashes via the Platform 
Configuration Registers. The CRTM is anextension of the 
BIOS which will be initialized first, measure parts of the 
BIOS block, and then pass control back over to the 
BIOS. Once the BIOS, boot loader, and OS kernel run 
and pass control to the OS, the expected configuration 
by examining the TPM's Platform Configuration Register. 
The main issue here is, any change to the code between 
CRTM and the OS running will result in anunseen PCR 
value. The SMRAM is to be properly setup by the BIOS 
at boot time and to remain tamper-proof from cache 
poisoning attacks as in [7]. To prevent these attacks, 
proper hardware configurations, such as System 
Management Range Register (SMRR) [9], should be 
used. 
A key technology of cloud computing is 
virtualization, which can lead to reduce the total cost 
and increase the application flexibility. However along 
with the se benefits come added security challenges. 
The extension of Trusted Computing to virtual 
environments can provide secure storage and ensure 
system integrity. In [4], it describes and analyse several 
existing virtualization of TPM (vTPM) designs: software-
based vTPM, hardware-based vTPM, para-virtualized 
TPM and property-based vTPM and analyse each of 
their limitations. Concerning about security is an 
important factor that affect the popularity of cloud 
computing. Incorporation of trusted computing into 
virtualized systems should significantly enhance cloud 
computing system security. In this paper, it briefly 
reviews the concepts virtualization and trusted 
computing, and proposal the requirements on a virtual 
TPM facility. It describes and analyse some existing 
vTPM designs. Finally, it discusses some open issues of 
the vTPM, using property-based attestation and secure 
VMvTPM migration protocols are the key research area 
sofvTPM in the future. 
In [5], it proposes DF Cloud, a secure data 
access control method of cloud storage services to 
handle these problems found in the typical cloud 
storage service Drop box.  DF Cloud relies on Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) [19] to manage all the 
encryption keys and define a key sharing protocol 
among legal users. It assumes that each client is mobile 
device using ARM Trust Zone[13] technology. The DF 
Cloud server prototype is implemented using ARM Fast 
model 7.1 and Open Virtualization software stack for 
ARM Trust Zone. For DF Cloud client, TPM functions are 
developed in the secure domain of ARM Trust Zone 
because most ARM-based mobile devices are not 
equipped with TPM chip. The DF Cloud framework 
defines TPM-based secure channel setup, TPM-based 
key management, remote client attestation, and a 
secure key share protocol across multiple 
users/devices. There are several security issues in cloud 
storage services, among these issues we mainly 
focused on data leakages that can occur in either client 
side or server-side. DF Cloud exploit client-side 
encryption technique, remote attestation for client plat 
form, and hardware based key management to build a 
secure access environment. DF Cloud also support 
secure key sharing protocol across the multiple devices 
or users. It implemented prototype on ARM Fast model 
to emulate ARM Cortex-A15 core and Open 
Virtualization’s software stack in environment setup. The 
performance overhead is quiet high, but if it adopts 
some optimization techniques such as shared memory 
between two World, then we can reduce overhead 
introduced in our current implementation. 
TPM is able to provide strong secure storage for 
sensitive data such as passwords. Although several 
commercial password managers have used TPM to 
cache passwords, they are not capable of protecting 
passwords during veriﬁcation. This [8] proposes a new 
TPM-based password caching and veriﬁcation method 
called Pwd CaVe. In addition to using TPM in password 
caching, Pwd CaVe also uses TPM during password 
veriﬁcation. In Pwd CaVe, all password-related 
computations are performed in the TPM. Pwd CaVe 
guarantees that once a password is cached in the TPM, 
it will be protected by the TPM through the rest of its 
lifetime, thus eliminating the possibility that passwords 
might be attacked in memory. Pwd CaVe eliminates the 
time that passwords stay in the memory during 
veriﬁcation, and therefore keep passwords from attacks 
in memory. Once a password is cached in the TPM, it 
will never be released out of the TPM, even in later 
password veriﬁcation. Again which proves, the user 
himself cannot be able to change the password even in 
emergency situations, in which the password is 
compromised. Thus, not efficient. 
In this [10], it address the issues by 
incorporating a hardware-based Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM) mechanism called the Trusted Extension 
Device (TED) together with the security model and 
protocol to allow stronger privacy of data compared to 
software-based security protocols. It demonstrates the 
concept of using TED for stronger protection and 
management of cryptographic keys and how the secure 
data sharing protocol will allow a data owner (e.g., 
author) to securely store data via untrusted Cloud 
services. Here, it prevents keys to be stolen by outsiders 
and dishonest authorised consumers. As part of our 
future work, this work has to improve the performance of 
this protocol to the extent that it will be feasible in the 
real-world scenario. It should also aim to incorporate 
© 2015   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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Portable Tpm Based User Attestation Architecture for Cloud Environments
larger data sizes. Furthermore, it must extend the 
current work to incorporate further data sharing control.  
In addition to security, most of the hardware that is 
being shipped today is equipped with the TPM which 
can be used for realization of trusted platforms. Recently 
several TPM attestation techniques such as binary 
attestation and property based attestation techniques 
have been proposed but there are some fundamental 
issues that need to be addressed for using these 
techniques in practice. In [11], it considers an 
architecture where different services are hosted on the 
cloud infrastructure by multiple cloud customers 
(tenants). Then it considers an attacker model that is 
specific to the cloud and some of the challenges with 
the current TPM based attestation techniques. In this 
model, the cloud service provider is used as the 
Certification Authority (CA) for the tenant virtual 
machines.  The CA only certifies the basic security 
properties which are the assurance on the traffic 
originating from the tenant virtual machine and 
validation of the tenant virtual machine transactions. The 
components of the CA monitor the interactions of the 
tenant virtual machine for the certified properties. Since 
the tenant virtual machines are running on the cloud 
service provider infrastructure, it is aware of the dynamic 
changes to the tenant virtual machine. The CA can 
terminate the ongoing transactions and/or dynamically 
isolate the tenant virtual machine if there is a variation in 
the behaviour of the tenant virtual machine from the 
certified properties. Hence this model is used to 
address the challenges with the current TPM based 
attestation techniques and efficiently deal with the 
attacks in the cloud. This model still need to get 
extended with the functionality of the CA to certify the 
behaviour of the tenant virtual machines. Since the Node 
Controller is aware of the dynamic changes to the tenant 
virtual machine, it has to ensure that the certified 
properties are satisfied by the tenant virtual machines. 
Group signatures have recently become 
important for enabling privacy-preserving attestation in 
projects such as Microsoft’s NGSCB eﬀort (formerly 
Palladium). Revocation is critical to the security of such 
systems. [15] construct a short group signature scheme 
that supports Veriﬁer Local Revocation (VLR). In this 
model, revocation messages are only sent to signature 
veriﬁers (as opposed to both signers and veriﬁers). 
Consequently there is no need to contact individual 
signers when some user is revoked. This model is 
appealing for systems providing attestation capabilities. 
The signatures are as short as standard RSA signatures 
with comparable security. Security of our group 
signature (in the random oracle model) is based on the 
Strong Diﬃe Hellman assumption and the Decision 
Linear assumption in bilinear groups. Here, a precise 
model for VLR group signatures and discussed its 
implications. It has described a short group signature 
scheme where user revocation only requires sending 
revocation information to signature veriﬁers, a setup we 
call veriﬁer-local revocation. Here, the signatures are 
short: only 141 bytes for a standard security level. They 
are shorter than group signatures built from the Strong-
RSA assumption and are shorter even than BBS short 
group signatures [8], which do not support veriﬁer-local 
revocation. There are still a number of open problems 
related to VLR signatures. Most importantly, is there an 
eﬃcient VLR group signature scheme where signature 
veriﬁcation time is sub-linear in the number of revoked 
users, without compromising user privacy. 
Employs a TPM based method to providea 
minimum Trusted Code Base (TCB) in [12], which can 
be used to detect the modification of the kernel. It 
requires advanced hardware features such as Dynamic 
Root of Trust Measurement (DRTM) and late launch. The 
scheme is also directly vulnerable to the scrubbing 
attack because the measurement target is responsible 
for invoking the integrity measurement. 
To overcome all these issues, we have 
proposed a portable hardware based security 
preserving model. Our scheme is different from theirs in 
that, our scheme offers more revocation capabilities 
than other schemes, and our scheme is built from the 
strong public key cryptographic assumptions whereas 
their scheme is constructed using bilinear maps. Thus, a 
high performance security model is proposed. 
III. Proposed System 
 Let us consider a case where a cloud provider, 
cloud users, a blacklisting controller and the cloud 
verifiers are concerned. The membership certificates for 
the cloud users are issued by the cloud provider. 
Membership certificates are blacklisted by the 
blacklisting controller. The cloud users in the system 
may vary and also users may access their data 
according to their need. Let us consider a hardware 
based authentication key in an ideal system. The 
operation carried out by the authentication keyKare 
initialize, register, membership approval and 
blacklisting. 
In initialize phase, every entity is controlled by 
the controller which is indicated by the authentication 
key. Users are need to be registered. A user requests 
the authenticator with K and the authenticator asks the 
cloud provider whether the user can get registered. If the 
cloud provider agrees, the authenticator notifies the user 
that he can become a member. 
In the membership approval phase, the 
authenticator sends a request that he wants to contact 
the verifier. With 𝕂𝕂, it informs the verifier that user wants 
to perform the membership approval without revealing 
to the verifier who the authenticator is. The verifier 
chooses a message𝑠𝑠 andsends 𝑠𝑠 to the authenticator. If 
the authenticator is not a member,𝕂𝕂 aborts. Otherwise, 
© 2015   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
8
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
  
om
p 
ut
er
 S
 c
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
T 
 e
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
  
  
V
ol
um
e 
X
V
 I
ss
ue
 I
 V
er
sio
n 
I
Ye
ar
  
 (
)
20
15
B
Portable Tpm Based User Attestation Architecture for Cloud Environments
𝕂𝕂 tellsthe authenticator whether he has been blacklisted 
and asks him whether to proceed. If the authenticator 
does not abort, 𝕂𝕂 lets the verifier know that a blacklisted 
user has signed the message 𝑠𝑠 .Otherwise, 𝕂𝕂  informs 
the verifier that 𝑠𝑠  has been signed by a legitimate 
member. Blacklist revokes the membership 
authentication. The blacklisting controller tells the 
authenticator to blacklist a user. If the user is not a 
group member, 𝕂𝕂  denies the request. Otherwise, 𝕂𝕂 
marks the user as blacklisted. 
A user who is not a member or is a member but 
has been blacklisted cannot succeed in membership 
approvaltoany verifiers. The verifier cannot identify who 
is the authenticator in a membership approval operation, 
thus proving anonymity. Blacklist causes verifiers to 
reject message assigned by a blacklisted user in an 
ideal system. In our protocol, if a user’s private key is 
exposed and the cloud user is blacklisted, the 
signatures from this blacklisted cloud user become link 
able to an honest verifier. As a result, corrupted users 
who reveal their private keys and are blacklisted 
deliberately lose their privacy. Thus, an authenticator 
can check whether the user has been blacklisted from 
on the blacklist, before the user signs asignature and 
sends it to the verifier. If the authenticator finds out that 
the user has been blacklisted, he can choose to not 
proceed. 
The security of our scheme relies on the public 
key cryptographic protocol and the Diffie-Hellman 
assumption. The public key cryptographic protocol is 
established as follows. 
It is computationally infeasible, on input of a 
random modulus 𝑀𝑀  and a random element 𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝔸𝔸𝑙𝑙∗ compute values 𝑖𝑖 > 1  and 𝑞𝑞  such that 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ≡
𝑎𝑎(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀) . In other words, for every probabilistic 
polynomial-time algorithm 𝑅𝑅, 
 
ℬ[𝑀𝑀 ← 𝒦𝒦(1𝑝𝑝),𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝔸𝔸𝑙𝑙∗, (𝑞𝑞, 𝑖𝑖) ← 𝑅𝑅(𝑀𝑀, 𝑎𝑎) ∶ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
≡ 𝑎𝑎(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀)⋀1 < 𝑖𝑖 < 𝑀𝑀]= 𝜙𝜙(𝑝𝑝) (1) 
where𝒦𝒦(1𝑝𝑝)  is an algorithm that generates a public 
keymodulusand𝜙𝜙(𝑝𝑝) is a negligible function. 
Let 𝑢𝑢 be an 𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢 -bit prime and 𝑣𝑣 is an𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣-bit prime 
such that𝑣𝑣|𝑢𝑢 − 1 . Let 𝑠𝑠 ∈  𝔸𝔸𝑢𝑢∗ be arandom element of 
order 𝑣𝑣. Then, for sufficiently large values of 𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢and 𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣 , 
the distribution {(𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥 , 𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦 , 𝑠𝑠𝑧𝑧)} is computationally 
indistinguishable from the distribution {(𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥 , 𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦 , 𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 )} 
where 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦  and 𝑧𝑧are random elements from𝔸𝔸𝑢𝑢 . It can 
beformally stated as, for every probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm 𝑅𝑅, the Diffie-Hellman assumption is given 
by: |B[𝑅𝑅(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥 , 𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦 , 𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 ) = 1]
−B[𝑅𝑅(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥 , 𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦 , 𝑠𝑠𝑧𝑧)= 1]| = 𝜙𝜙(𝑝𝑝) (2) 
Where 𝜙𝜙(𝑝𝑝) a negligible function and the 
probabilities is are taken over the choice of 𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣, 𝑠𝑠 
according to some generation function 𝒦𝒦(1𝑝𝑝) and the 
random choice of 𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧in 𝔸𝔸𝑢𝑢 . 
Remote authentication of the hardware based 
authentication key is enabled in the cryptographic 
protocols. Here, it preserves the privacy of the cloud 
user which contains the key 𝕂𝕂. This protocol consists of 
the cloud provider, authenticator who provides access 
issued by the cloud provider and the verifier who verifies 
with the authenticator. The authenticator consists of the 
portable key 𝕂𝕂 which preserves the privacy for the cloud 
user. The protocol is constructed by the Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya signature scheme, where it has two secret 
messages 𝑚𝑚0 and 𝑚𝑚1 , and attains the CLsignature 
(membership of the user)on 𝑚𝑚0  and 𝑚𝑚1 from the cloud 
provider through a secure protocol, and thus the user is 
verified by the verifier. Here, the authenticator chooses 
two random 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 -bit secret messages  𝑚𝑚0 and 𝑚𝑚1 , then 
interacts with the cloud provider, and inthe end 
obtains (𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞)  from the protocol such 
that 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺0𝑚𝑚0𝐺𝐺1𝑚𝑚1𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞 ≡ 𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀) . The authenticator will 
check with verifier that the user is verified and possess 
the CL-signature on the values of 𝑚𝑚0 and 𝑚𝑚1. This can 
be done by values (𝑚𝑚0,𝑚𝑚1,𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖, 𝑞𝑞) such that 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺0𝑚𝑚0𝐺𝐺1𝑚𝑚1𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞 ≡ 𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀) .Let 𝑚𝑚 = 𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑚𝑚12𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚  the 
authenticator also computes 𝑃𝑃 ∶= 𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢where𝒟𝒟 is 
a generator of an algebra group wherecomputing 
discrete logarithms is infeasible, and proves to the 
verifier that the exponent 𝑚𝑚 is related to𝑚𝑚0  and 𝑚𝑚1 . In 
this protocol, it can choose𝒟𝒟:  the value of 𝒟𝒟  can be 
chosenrandomly by the authenticator, or can be derived 
from theverifier’s name by using an appropriate hash 
function. If authentication key𝕂𝕂  was found comprised 
and its private key 𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚0,𝑚𝑚1,𝑞𝑞 was exposed, the 
values 𝑚𝑚0 and 𝑚𝑚1 are extracted and put on a blacklist. 
The verifier can then check the public key 𝑃𝑃  in 
thesignature against this blacklist by comparing it with 
𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚0+𝑚𝑚12𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 for all pairs𝑚𝑚0 and 𝑚𝑚1 on the black list. In our 
scheme, there are several types of entities: a cloud 
provider, cloud users, a blacklisting controller and 
verifiers. The cloud provider and blacklisting controller 
could be the same entity or separate entities. 
Our scheme builds in concern with the 
cryptographic protocol scheme and uses the 
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme as 
underlying building block. To simplify our presentation, 
we modified the cryptographic protocol scheme in the 
following ways: 1) each user chooses a single secret 𝑚𝑚 
instead of two secrets, and 2) the signature operation is 
performed solely by the user (along with authentication 
key 𝕂𝕂 ), instead of split by two separate entities 
(authentication key 𝕂𝕂  and host in the cryptographic 
protocol scheme). 
In the register phase, a cloud user chooses a 
secret message 𝑚𝑚  and sends the cloud providera 
© 2015   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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commit mentto 𝑚𝑚, i.e., 𝐶𝐶 ∶= 𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞′  where𝑞𝑞′  is a value 
chosen randomly by the user to blind the 𝑚𝑚. Also, the 
usercomputes𝑃𝑃 ∶= 𝒟𝒟𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢 , where 𝒟𝒟𝐼𝐼 is a number 
derivedfrom the cloud provider’s basename. The user 
sends(𝑃𝑃,𝐶𝐶)  to the cloud provider. The provider then 
issues a membership for the user based on 𝐶𝐶 . The 
cloud provider chooses a random integer 𝑞𝑞′′  and a 
random prime 𝑖𝑖 , then computes𝑅𝑅  such that𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞
′′
≡
𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀) , and sends the user (𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞′′ ) . The cloud 
provider also proves to the user that he computed 𝑅𝑅 
correctly.The CL signature on 𝑚𝑚 is then𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞 ∶= 𝑞𝑞′ + 𝑞𝑞′′ . 
The user’sprivate key is set to be(𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚,𝑞𝑞).A user can 
now prove that he is a valid memberby proving that he 
has a CL signature on the value 𝑚𝑚.This can be done by 
values of 𝑚𝑚,𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖and 𝑞𝑞  such that𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞 ≡ 𝐴𝐴 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀) . 
Also, theuser computes𝑃𝑃 ∶= 𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢  where 𝒟𝒟  is a 
random basepicked up by the user, reveals 𝒟𝒟and 𝑃𝑃 , 
and proves that log𝒟𝒟 𝑃𝑃 is the same as the one in his 
private key. The value𝑃𝑃 serves the purpose of blacklist. 
Same as in the cryptographic scheme, if a user’s private 
key(𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚,𝑞𝑞) is compromisedand gets exposed to the 
public, 𝑚𝑚  is put in the blacklist. The verifier can then 
check 𝑃𝑃  in the signature against the blacklist by 
comparing it with 𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚� for all𝑚𝑚�  in the blacklist. We refer 
this type of blacklist as private key-based blacklist and 
use𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣  to denote the blacklist of this type. 
This scheme supports two additional blacklist 
methods, one is signature-based blacklist and the other 
is cloud provider-based blacklist. In signature-based 
blacklist, suppose a verifier received a signature from an 
authenticator and then decided that the authenticator 
was compromised. The verifier reports the signature to 
the blacklisting controller who later places(𝒟𝒟,𝑃𝑃) of the 
signatureto the signature-based blacklist, where log𝒟𝒟 𝑃𝑃 
is thesecret of the compromised authenticator. To prove 
membership, auser with private key (𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚,𝑞𝑞) now 
needs not only toprove the (𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚,𝑞𝑞)  such 
that𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞
′′
≡ 𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀) but also to prove that 𝑚𝑚 in his 
private key isdifferent fromlog𝒟𝒟 𝑃𝑃� for each�𝒟𝒟� ,𝑃𝑃�� pair in 
the signature-based blacklist. We use𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  to denote the 
blacklist of this type. In the cloud provider-based 
blacklist, the provider obtained(𝑃𝑃,𝐶𝐶)from a user when 
the user registers and laterdecided to revoke this user 
from some reason. The cloud provider sends(𝑃𝑃,𝐻𝐻) to 
the blacklisting controller who places 𝑃𝑃  to the cloud 
provider-based blacklist, where log𝒟𝒟𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃 is the secret of 
the blacklisted user. To prove the membership of the 
user, a user needs to prove that 𝑚𝑚 in his private keyis 
different from  log𝒟𝒟𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃�  for each𝑃𝑃�  in the cloud provider-
based blacklist. We use cloud provider 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝  to denote the 
blacklist of this type. 
a) Security 
Let us consider the security parameters 
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′ 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓𝑝𝑝𝜇𝜇 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢  and 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣 where𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀(2048) is the size of 
the public-key modulus, 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣(208) isthe size of the 𝑚𝑚 ’s 
(user’s secret, part of membership privatekey), 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(576) 
is the size of 𝑖𝑖’s (exponent, part of membership private 
key), 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′ (128) is the size of the interval the 𝑖𝑖′ ’s are 
chosen from, 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞(2720)  is the size of the 𝑞𝑞 ’s (random 
value, part of membership private key), 𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃(80)  is the 
security parameter controlling the statistical property, 
𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓(256) is the output length of the hash function used 
for Fiat-Shamir heuristic, 𝑝𝑝𝜇𝜇 (80) is the security parameter 
needed for the reduction in the proof of security, 
𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 (1632) is the size of the modulus 𝑢𝑢, and 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣(208) is the 
size of the order𝑣𝑣 of the subgroup of𝔸𝔸𝑢𝑢∗  that is used for 
blacklist checking. We require that 
𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 + 2 + 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥{𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 , 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ′ }< 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 + 𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓+ 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥�𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝑝𝑝𝜇𝜇 + 3, 𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+ 2} < 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 , 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 = 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞        (3) 
The parameters  𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢  and 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣 should be chosen such that the
 
discrete logarithm problem in the sub
 group of𝔸𝔸𝑢𝑢∗ of order 𝑣𝑣 with 𝑢𝑢  and 𝑣𝑣  being primes such that 𝑢𝑢 ∈ [2𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢−1, 2𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 − 1]
 
and 𝑣𝑣 ∈ [2𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣−1, 2𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣 − 1] , has 
about the same difficulty as factoring𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 -bit public-key 
modulus.
 b)
 
Generating authentication keys
 The key
 
generation program also produces a non-
interactive proof
 
that the public key was formed 
correctly.
 
Here we describe how the cloud provider 
chooses the public key and the user issuing private key. 
The later will guarantee the security
 
properties, i.e., that 
privacy and anonymity of signatures will hold. The cloud 
provider chooses a public-key cryptographic 
modulus𝑀𝑀 = 𝑢𝑢𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀
 
with 𝑢𝑢𝑀𝑀 = 2𝑢𝑢′𝑀𝑀 + 1, 𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀 = 2𝑣𝑣′𝑀𝑀 + 1
 such that 𝑢𝑢𝑀𝑀 ,𝑢𝑢′𝑀𝑀 ,𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀 ,𝑣𝑣′𝑀𝑀  are all primes,𝑢𝑢𝑀𝑀 and 𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀 have the same length, and𝑚𝑚
 
has 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 bits.Furthermore, the 
cloud provider chooses a random generator𝑠𝑠′of
 
𝑍𝑍𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀 , 
the group of quadratic residues modulo 𝑀𝑀 . Next, it 
chooses random integers 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 , 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 ,𝑒𝑒𝑞𝑞 , 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏 , 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∈ [1, 𝑢𝑢′𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣′𝑀𝑀]
 and computes
 
𝑠𝑠 ∶= 𝑠𝑠′ 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀; 𝑡𝑡 ∶= 𝑠𝑠′ 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀;  𝐺𝐺 ∶= 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀; 𝑄𝑄 ∶= 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑞𝑞 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀; 𝐴𝐴 ∶= 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀. (4) It produces a non-interactive proof that𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡,𝐺𝐺,𝑄𝑄
 and 𝐴𝐴
 
are computed correctly, i.e., 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 〈𝑠𝑠′ 〉 and 
𝑄𝑄,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺 ∈ 〈𝑡𝑡〉. This can be proved using the standard cut-
and-choose technique. The cloud provider generates a 
group of prime order as follows:it chooses random 
primes 𝑢𝑢
 
and 𝑣𝑣
 
such that𝑢𝑢 = 𝜇𝜇𝑣𝑣 + 1
 
for some 𝜇𝜇
 
with 
𝑣𝑣| 𝜇𝜇, 𝑢𝑢 ∈ [2𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢−1, 2𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 − 1], and 𝑣𝑣 ∈ [2𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣−1, 2𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣 − 1]. It then 
chooses a random 𝑎𝑎′ ← 𝔸𝔸𝑢𝑢∗ suchthat 𝑎𝑎′
(𝑢𝑢−1)/𝑣𝑣 ≢1(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢)  and sets 𝑎𝑎 ∶= 𝑎𝑎′(𝑢𝑢−1)/𝑣𝑣  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢 . Finally, the cloud provider publishes the public key
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(𝑀𝑀, 𝑠𝑠′ , 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡,𝐺𝐺,𝑄𝑄,𝐴𝐴,𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣,𝑎𝑎) and the proof, and
stores(𝑢𝑢′𝑀𝑀 ,𝑣𝑣′𝑀𝑀) as the user issuing private key.
  
In addition to generating the user public key 
and user issuing private key, the cloud provider 
generates also a long
 
term
 
public
 
private key pair
 
(𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 ,𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼−1). The cloud provider publishes the
 
public
 
key 𝑃𝑃. 
This key is used for authentication between
 
the
 
cloud 
provider and any user who wants to become a 
registered member. Analogously, the blacklisting 
controller has long term
 
public/private key pair(𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 ,𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀−1). 
The blacklisting controller uses its key to sign the 
blacklist.
 c)
 
Verification of the Cloud Provider’s Public Key
 
The user’s public key is (𝑀𝑀, 𝑠𝑠′ , 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡,𝐺𝐺,𝑄𝑄,𝐴𝐴,𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣,𝑎𝑎)
 
and
 
the proof that 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡,𝑄𝑄,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺
 
are formed properly. Any user inthe system can verify 
the correctness of the group public key are as follows. 
Firstly, it verify the proof that𝑄𝑄,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺 ∈ 〈𝑡𝑡〉and 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 〈𝑠𝑠′ 〉. 
Then check whether 𝑢𝑢
 
and 𝑣𝑣
 
are primes,𝑣𝑣| (𝑢𝑢 − 1), 𝑣𝑣 ∤
𝑢𝑢−1
𝑣𝑣
and 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣 ≡ 1(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢). Later check whether all public key parameters have the required length.
 
If 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡,𝑄𝑄,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺
 
are not formed correctly, it 
couldpotentially mean that the security properties for the 
usersdo not hold. However, it is sufficient if the users 
verify theproof that 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡,𝑄𝑄,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺
 
are computed correctly 
only once. Also, if 𝑎𝑎
 
does not generate a subgroup 
of𝔸𝔸𝑢𝑢∗ , the cloud provider could potentially use this to link 
different signatures. As argued in, it is not necessary to 
prove that 𝑀𝑀
 
is a productof two safe
 
primes for the 
anonymity of the users. In fact, itwould be very 
expensive for the cloud provider to prove that 𝑀𝑀
 
is a 
safe-prime product.
 d)
 
Registration
 
This is a protocol which runs between the cloud 
provider and auser. The public input to this protocol is 
the user
 
public
 
key (𝑀𝑀, 𝑠𝑠′ , 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡,𝐺𝐺,𝑄𝑄,𝐴𝐴, 𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣,𝑎𝑎)
 
and the 
cloud provider’s long-termpublic key𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼
 
and the cloud 
provider’s basename 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼 . The privateinput of the 
cloud provider is the user issuing private key.
 
We 
assume that the user and the cloud
 
provider have 
established an
 
authentic channel, i.e., the user needs to 
make sure that he
 
talks to the right cloud provider and 
the cloud provider needs to be sure that
 
the user is 
allowed to register for the membership. Note that we do 
not
 
require secrecy of the communication channel.
 
Let 𝜓𝜓(∙)
 
and 𝜓𝜓𝑢𝑢 (∙)
 
be two collision-resistant hash 
functions: 𝜓𝜓(∙) ∶ {0,1}∗ ⟶ {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓
 
and 𝜓𝜓𝑢𝑢 ∶ {0,1}∗ →{0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢+𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃 . In the register protocol, the user verifies that 
the user public key
 
(𝑀𝑀, 𝑠𝑠′ , 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡,𝐺𝐺,𝑄𝑄,𝐴𝐴, 𝑢𝑢,𝑣𝑣,𝑎𝑎)is signed by 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 . Then both the user and cloud provider computes 
𝒟𝒟𝐼𝐼 ∶= 𝜓𝜓𝑢𝑢 (𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼)(𝑢𝑢−1)/𝑣𝑣  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢 .The user chooses at random 𝑚𝑚 ← 𝔸𝔸𝑣𝑣∗ ; 𝑞𝑞′ ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀+𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃 then computes 𝑃𝑃 ∶=𝒟𝒟𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢  and 𝐶𝐶 ∶= 𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞
′
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀 . The user sends (𝑃𝑃,𝐶𝐶)
 
to the cloud provider. Therefore, the user proves 
to the cloud provider the knowledge of 𝑚𝑚
 
and𝑞𝑞′ . He 
runs as the authenticator of the protocol
 
with the cloud 
provider as the verifier. 
 𝕒𝕒 = �(𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞′) ∶ 𝐶𝐶 ∶= 𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞′ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢 ∧ 𝑃𝑃 ∶= 𝒟𝒟𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢 ∧ 𝑚𝑚∈ {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚+𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 +1 ∧ 𝑞𝑞′∈ {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀+𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 +1�
 
 
Thus,
 
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃{𝕒𝕒}(𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼)
 
(5)
 
The cloud provider chooses a random 𝑞𝑞′′ ←[2𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞−1, 2𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 − 1]
 
and a random prime𝑖𝑖 ← [2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′ ]
 
and computes
 
                   𝑅𝑅 ∶= � 𝐴𝐴
𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞′′
�
1
𝑖𝑖�
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀
 
         (6)
To convince the user that 𝑅𝑅
 
was correctly computed,the
 
cloud provider as authenticator runs the protocol
  
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃 �(𝑓𝑓) ∶ 𝑅𝑅 ≡ � 𝐴𝐴
𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞′′
�
𝑓𝑓
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀� (𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶)
 
         (7) 
with the host so that,
 
a.
 
The user chooses a random integer
 
𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓
 
and sends 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐
 
to the cloud provider.
 
b.
 
The cloud provider randomly chooses 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ←[0,𝑢𝑢′𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣′𝑀𝑀]
 
and computes
 
𝑅𝑅� ∶= � 𝐴𝐴
𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞′′
�
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀
 
(8) 
𝑧𝑧′ ∶= 𝜓𝜓�𝑀𝑀 ∥ 𝐴𝐴 ∥ 𝑄𝑄 ∥ 𝐶𝐶 ∥ 𝑞𝑞′′ ∥ 𝐴𝐴 ∥ ?̃?𝐴 ∥ 𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶�
 
(9) 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∶= 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑧′ 𝑖𝑖� 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢′𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣′𝑀𝑀
 
(10) 
and sends 𝑧𝑧′ , 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
 
and (𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞′′ )
 
to the user.
 
c.
 
The user verifies whether 𝑖𝑖
 
is a prime and lies 
in[2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′ ], computes
 
𝑅𝑅� ∶= 𝑅𝑅−𝑧𝑧′ � 𝐴𝐴
𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞′′
�
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀
 
(11) 
and checks whether 𝑧𝑧′ = 𝜓𝜓�𝑀𝑀 ∥ 𝐴𝐴 ∥ 𝑄𝑄 ∥ 𝐶𝐶 ∥ 𝑞𝑞′′ ∥ 𝐴𝐴 ∥ ?̃?𝐴 ∥
𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶). 
The user sets𝑞𝑞 ∶= 𝑞𝑞′′ + 𝑞𝑞′
 
and stores(𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚,𝑞𝑞)
 
as itsmembership private key.
 
Same as in the cryptographic protocol scheme, 
the cloud provider proves to the
 
user that 𝑅𝑅
 
was formed 
correctly, i.e., 𝑅𝑅
 
lies in 〈𝑡𝑡〉. In above procedure, the cloud 
provider proves that 𝑅𝑅 ≡ �𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶−1𝑄𝑄−𝑞𝑞′′ �𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀)
 
for 
some value 𝑓𝑓 .Inthesetupprogram, the cloud provider 
proves that 𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 ∈ 〈𝑡𝑡〉 .Since 𝐶𝐶 ∶= 𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞′
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀 , the 
user can conclude that 𝑅𝑅 ∈ 〈𝑡𝑡〉 . Thereason for 
© 2015   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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requiring 𝑅𝑅 ∈ 〈𝑡𝑡〉 is to assure that later, in the
membership approval protocol, 𝑅𝑅 can be statistically 
hiddenin〈𝑡𝑡〉 . Otherwise, an adversarial cloud provider 
  
 
could link signatures
 
generated by users whose 𝑅𝑅
 
does
not lie in 〈𝑡𝑡〉. Notethat schemes such as have prevented 
this byensuring that 𝑀𝑀
 
is a safe-prime product and then 
made surethat all elements are members of 𝑍𝑍𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀 . 
However, provingthat a modulus is a safe-prime product 
is rather inefficientand hence the setup of these
 
schemes is not practical asour scheme.
 
e)
 
Membership Approval Protocol
 
The membership approval protocol is a protocol 
run by an authenticator and a verifier. It consists of login 
and verify. In the login step, the authenticator initializes 
the interaction with the verifier by
 
sending a request to 
the verifier. There are three types of blacklist: private-
key-based blacklist, signature-based blacklist, and 
cloud provider-based blacklist. Therefore, the blacklist 𝑉𝑉
 
contains three sublists, i.e.,𝑉𝑉 = �𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 ,𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ,𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 �
 
Let𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣
 
be the blacklist for private-key-based blacklist, in which 
each element
 
is a value in 〈𝑎𝑎〉 . Let 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
 
be the 
blacklistforsignature-based blacklist, in which each 
element is a pairof values in〈𝑎𝑎〉. Let cloud provider 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝
 
be the blacklist for cloud provider-based blacklist, in 
which each element is a value in〈𝑎𝑎〉. The blacklisting 
controller maintains the blacklist and regularly publishes 
the newest blacklisttoeveryone in the system, signed 
using his private key. Thatis, the
 
blacklisting controller 
publishes �𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 �𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺−1 , �𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺−1
 
and �𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 �𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺−1. 
The verifier first chooses a message𝑠𝑠
 
and a 
nonce 𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞 ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 . The verifier then sends to the 
authenticator 𝑠𝑠 , 𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞 , �𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺−1
 
and �𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 �𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺−1
 
as the 
challenge. After the authenticator receives the 
challenges from the verifier, the authenticator verifies the 
content of �𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺−1
 
and �𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 �𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺−1 using the blacklisting 
controller’s public key 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 .  Let   (𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚,𝑞𝑞) be the authenticator’s private key. For each element (𝒟𝒟𝛼𝛼 ,𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼)in �𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 � , the
 
authenticator checks whether 𝒟𝒟𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 ≢
𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢
) . If there exists some 𝛼𝛼
 
such that 𝒟𝒟𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 ≢
𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢
) , it means that the authenticator has been 
blacklisted, the authenticator aborts the membership 
protocol. Analogously, for each item 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 in 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 , the 
authenticator checks whether 𝒟𝒟𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 ≢ 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢
)
 
where 
𝒟𝒟𝐼𝐼 is the base derived from the cloud provider’s 
basename 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼 . The authenticator quits the 
membership protocol if
 
the check fails.
 
Note that the 
authenticator can directly obtain 𝑉𝑉
 
from the blacklisting 
controller and checks whether he has been blacklisted. 
However, it is not required for the authenticator
 
to
 
conduct such operation. Also note that it is the verifier’s
 
responsibility to obtain the latest blacklist from the 
blacklisting controller. If𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
 
and 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝
 
in the verifier’s
 
challenge are not the latest ones, then there is a chance 
that
 
some blacklisted users may successfully perform 
membership
 
proof to the verifier without being detected.
 
i.
 
Login
 
This step is run by the authenticator. The input 
to this program is
 
the group public 
key,(𝑀𝑀, 𝑠𝑠′ , 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡,𝐺𝐺,𝑄𝑄,𝐴𝐴,𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣, 𝑎𝑎)
 
the authenticator’s
 
private 
key (𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞), the verifier’s message 𝑠𝑠 and nonce𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞 , the signature-based blacklist 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
 
and the blacklist-based 
blacklist 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 . The output to this program is a signature 
𝕊𝕊 produced by the authenticator. Firstly, the 
authenticator picks a random 𝒟𝒟 ← 〈𝑎𝑎〉
 
and two integers 
𝕆𝕆,𝜇𝜇 ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀+𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃
 
and computes ℙ1 ∶= 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝕆𝕆 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀 , 
 
ℙ2 ∶= 𝑠𝑠𝕆𝕆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠′ )𝜇𝜇  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀,   𝑃𝑃∶= 𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢 Then, the authenticator produces a signature of knowledge that ℙ1
 
and ℙ2 are commitments to the 
authenticator’s private key and 𝑃𝑃
 
was computed using 
the authenticator’s
 
secret
 
𝑚𝑚. That is, the authenticator 
computes the signature of knowledge
 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃�𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞, 𝑖𝑖,𝕆𝕆, 𝜇𝜇, 𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇 ∶ 𝐴𝐴
≡  ℙ1𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀) ∧ ℙ2≡  𝑠𝑠𝕆𝕆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠′)𝜇𝜇 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀) ∧ 1≡ ℙ2−𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠′)𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀) ∧ 𝑃𝑃≡ 𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢) ∧𝑚𝑚∈ (0,1)𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 +𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 +1 ∧ (𝑖𝑖 − 2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)
∈ {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′ +𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 +1��𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞 ∥ 𝑠𝑠�
 
(12) 
with the following steps:
 
a.
 
The authenticator picks random integers
 
𝜇𝜇𝑞𝑞 ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞+𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 , 𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚 ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚+𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓
 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′ +𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 , 
 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 +1
 
𝜇𝜇𝕆𝕆,𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀+2𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 , 
 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆 , 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇 ←
 
{0,1}2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀+2𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 +1
 
b.
 
The authenticator computes
 
ℙ1� ∶= ℙ1𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝜇𝜇𝑞𝑞 𝑡𝑡−𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀)  ℙ2�
∶= 𝑠𝑠𝜇𝜇𝕆𝕆𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠′)𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀)
 
ℙ3� ∶= ℙ2−𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠′)𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀)  𝑃𝑃�
∶= 𝒟𝒟𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢
 
c.
 
The authenticator computes
 
𝑧𝑧1 ∶= 𝜓𝜓�𝑀𝑀 ∥ 𝑠𝑠′ ∥ 𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑡𝑡 ∥ 𝐺𝐺 ∥ 𝑄𝑄 ∥ 𝐴𝐴 ∥ 𝑢𝑢 ∥ 𝑣𝑣 ∥ 𝑎𝑎 ∥ 𝒟𝒟 ∥ 𝑃𝑃
∥ ℙ1 ∥ ℙ2 ∥ ℙ1� ∥ ℙ2� ∥ ℙ3� ∥ 𝑃𝑃� ∥ 𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞�
 
d.
 
The authenticator computes(over the integers)
 
𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞 ∶= 𝜇𝜇𝑞𝑞 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝑞𝑞, 
 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 ∶= 𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝑚𝑚, 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∶= 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ (𝑖𝑖 − 2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖), 
 
𝑏𝑏𝜇𝜇 ∶= 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝜇𝜇, 
 
𝑏𝑏𝕆𝕆
∶= 𝜇𝜇𝕆𝕆 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝕆𝕆, 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆 ∶= 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝕆𝕆 ∙ 𝑖𝑖, 
 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∶= 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝑖𝑖2, 
 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇
∶= 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝜇𝜇
 
e.
 
The authenticator sets
 
𝕊𝕊1 ∶= �𝒟𝒟,𝑃𝑃,ℙ1,ℙ2, 𝑧𝑧1, 𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞 ,𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 ,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ,𝑏𝑏𝜇𝜇 ,𝑏𝑏𝕆𝕆,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆 ,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇 �
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Portable Tpm Based User Attestation Architecture for Cloud Environments
The authenticator produces a signature of 
knowledge that his private key has not been blacklisted 
in 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 . Let 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = �(𝒟𝒟1,𝑃𝑃1 ), … �𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚2 ,𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚2�� . The 
authenticator computes the signature of knowledge
 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃{(𝑚𝑚) ∶ 𝑃𝑃 ≡ 𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢) ∧ 𝑃𝑃1≢ 𝒟𝒟1𝑚𝑚 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢) ∧ …∧ 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚2≢ 𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚2𝑚𝑚 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢)}�𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞 ∥ 𝑠𝑠� 
with the following steps:
 
a.
 
The authenticator chooses a random𝜇𝜇 ⟵ 𝔸𝔸𝑣𝑣
 
and 
computes
 
𝑃𝑃� ∶= 𝒟𝒟𝜇𝜇  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢. b.
 
For 𝛼𝛼 = 1, …𝑚𝑚2 , the authenticator does the 
following:
 i.
 
The authenticator chooses a random𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼 ⟵ 𝔸𝔸𝑣𝑣. 
ii.
 
The authenticator computes
 𝐶𝐶𝛼𝛼 ∶= 𝒟𝒟𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢 𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼 ∶= 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼
𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢  
 
𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼 ∶= 𝐶𝐶𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢 iii.
 
The authenticator chooses a random integer 
𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼 ⟵ 𝔸𝔸𝑣𝑣
 iv.
 
The authenticator computes
 ?̃?𝐶𝛼𝛼 ∶= 𝒟𝒟𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢 𝐸𝐸�𝛼𝛼 ∶= 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼
𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢 𝐹𝐹�𝛼𝛼 ∶= 𝐶𝐶𝛼𝛼
𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢 c.
 
The authenticator computes
 
𝑧𝑧2 ∶= 𝜓𝜓�𝑢𝑢 ∥ 𝑣𝑣 ∥ 𝑎𝑎 ∥ 𝒟𝒟 ∥ 𝑃𝑃 ∥ 𝑃𝑃� ∥ 𝐶𝐶1 ∥ 𝐸𝐸1 ∥ 𝐹𝐹1 ∥ ?̃?𝐶1 ∥ 𝐸𝐸�1 ∥ 𝐹𝐹�1
∥ ⋯ ∥ 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚2 ∥ 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚2 ∥ 𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚2 ∥ ?̃?𝐶𝑚𝑚2 ∥ 𝐸𝐸�𝑚𝑚2
∥ 𝐹𝐹�𝑚𝑚2 ∥ 𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞�
 d.
 
For 𝛼𝛼 = 1, …𝑚𝑚2 , the authenticator computes 
𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼 ∶= 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝑧𝑧2 ∙ 𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑣𝑣 e.
 
The authenticator
 
computes 𝑏𝑏 ∶= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑧𝑧2 ∙ 𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑣𝑣. f.
 
The authenticator sets
 𝕊𝕊2 ∶= �𝒟𝒟,𝑃𝑃, 𝑧𝑧2,𝑏𝑏,𝐶𝐶1,𝐸𝐸1,𝐹𝐹1,𝑏𝑏1, …𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚2 ,𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚2 ,𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚2 ,𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚2�
 The authenticator produces a signature of 
knowledge that his private key has not been blacklisted 
in cloud provider 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 . Let cloud provider 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 =
�𝒟𝒟1,𝑃𝑃1 , …𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚3� . The authenticator computes the 
signature of knowledge
 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃{(𝑚𝑚) ∶ 𝑃𝑃 ≡ 𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢) ∧ 𝑃𝑃1≢ 𝒟𝒟1𝑚𝑚 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢) ∧ …∧ 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚3≢ 𝒟𝒟𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢)}�𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞 ∥ 𝑠𝑠� The authenticator outputs the signature 
𝕊𝕊 ∶= (𝕊𝕊1,𝕊𝕊2,𝕊𝕊3)
 
and sends 𝕊𝕊
 
to the verifier.
 
Observe that in the sign process, the 
authenticator proves the knowledge of 𝑚𝑚
 
such that 
𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚 ≡ 𝐾𝐾
 
(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢)
 
three times, one in each signature of 
knowledge. We could merge all three
 
signatures of 
knowledge together such that the authenticator only 
needs to prove the knowledge of 𝑚𝑚
 
once, thus 
couldimprove the performance of membership 
approvalslightly.
 
When we present the above sign 
process, we choose to have
 
three separate proof of 
knowledge protocols to make our
 
protocol easier to 
read.
 
ii.
 
Verify
 
The group public key
 
is (𝑀𝑀, 𝑠𝑠′ , 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡,𝐺𝐺,𝑄𝑄,𝐴𝐴,𝑎𝑎,𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣, ), the message 𝑠𝑠, the nonce 𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞 , 
the corresponding signature𝕊𝕊 ∶= (𝕊𝕊1,𝕊𝕊2,𝕊𝕊3) , and the 
blacklist 𝑉𝑉 = �𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 ,𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ,𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 � . The verifier verifies the 
signature asfollows:
 
1.
 
The verifier verifies that 𝑠𝑠
 
and 𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞
 
are the message 
and the nonce he sent to the authenticator in the 
challenge step. The verifier also verifies (𝒟𝒟,𝑃𝑃)in 𝕊𝕊1, 
𝕊𝕊2
 
and 𝕊𝕊3all matches.
 
2.
 
The verifier verifies the correctness of 
 
𝕊𝕊1 = �𝒟𝒟,𝑃𝑃,ℙ1,ℙ2, 𝑧𝑧1,𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞 ,𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 ,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ,𝑏𝑏𝜇𝜇 ,𝑏𝑏𝕆𝕆,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆 ,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇 � as 
follows:
 
i.
 
The verifier computes 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
′ ∶= 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
 
and 
computes 
 
ℙ�1 ∶= 𝐴𝐴−𝑧𝑧1 ℙ1𝑏𝑏′ 𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞 𝑡𝑡−𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀)
 
ℙ�2 ∶= ℙ2−𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝕆𝕆𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠′)𝑏𝑏𝜇𝜇 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀)
 
ℙ�3 ∶= ℙ2−𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠′ )𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀)
 
𝑃𝑃�
∶= 𝑃𝑃−𝑧𝑧1𝒟𝒟𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢
 
ii.
 
The verifier verifies that
 
𝒟𝒟,𝑃𝑃 ∈ 〈𝑎𝑎〉, 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 ∈ {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 +𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 +1, 
 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∈{0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′ +𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 +1
 
iii.
 
The verifier verifies that
 
𝑧𝑧1 ∶= 𝜓𝜓�𝑀𝑀 ∥ 𝑠𝑠′ ∥ 𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑡𝑡 ∥ 𝐺𝐺 ∥ 𝑄𝑄 ∥ 𝐴𝐴 ∥ 𝑢𝑢 ∥ 𝑣𝑣 ∥ 𝑎𝑎 ∥ 𝒟𝒟 ∥ 𝑃𝑃
∥ ℙ1 ∥ ℙ2 ∥ ℙ1� ∥ ℙ2� ∥ ℙ3� ∥ 𝑃𝑃� ∥ 𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞�
 
 
3.
 
The verifier verifies that the authenticator’s private 
key has not been black
 
listed
 
in 𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 , where 
𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 = �𝑚𝑚1, …𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1 �. . For 𝛼𝛼 = 1, …𝑚𝑚2 , the verifier 
verifies that𝑃𝑃 ≢𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢)
 
4.
 
The verifier verifies the correctness of 
 
𝕊𝕊2 ∶= �𝒟𝒟,𝑃𝑃, 𝑧𝑧2,𝑏𝑏,𝐶𝐶1,𝐸𝐸1,𝐹𝐹1,𝑏𝑏1, …𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚2 ,𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚2 ,𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚2 ,𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚2�based 
on 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = �(𝒟𝒟1,𝑃𝑃1 ), … �𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚2 ,𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚2��. It takes the following 
steps:
 
a.
 
The verifier computes 𝑃𝑃� ≡ 𝑃𝑃−𝑧𝑧2𝒟𝒟𝑏𝑏(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢)
 
b.
 
For 𝛼𝛼 = 1, …𝑚𝑚2, the verifier does the following:
 
i.
 
The verifier verifies that
 
𝐶𝐶𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼 ∈ 〈𝑎𝑎〉, 
 
𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼 ∈ 𝔸𝔸𝑣𝑣, 
 
𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼 ≠ 𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼
 
ii.
 
The verifier computes
 
?̂?𝐶𝛼𝛼 ∶= 𝐶𝐶𝛼𝛼−𝑧𝑧1𝒟𝒟𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢, 
 
𝐸𝐸�𝛼𝛼 ∶= 𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼−𝑧𝑧1𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢 , 
 
𝐹𝐹�𝛼𝛼 ∶= 𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼−𝑧𝑧1𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢
 
c.
 
The
 
verifier verifies that
 
𝑧𝑧2 ∶= 𝜓𝜓�𝑢𝑢 ∥ 𝑣𝑣 ∥ 𝑎𝑎 ∥ 𝒟𝒟 ∥ 𝑃𝑃 ∥ 𝑃𝑃� ∥ 𝐶𝐶1 ∥ 𝐸𝐸1 ∥ 𝐹𝐹1 ∥ ?̃?𝐶1 ∥ 𝐸𝐸�1 ∥ 𝐹𝐹�1
∥ ⋯ ∥ 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚2 ∥ 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚2 ∥ 𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚2 ∥ ?̃?𝐶𝑚𝑚2 ∥ 𝐸𝐸�𝑚𝑚2
∥ 𝐹𝐹�𝑚𝑚2 ∥ 𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞�
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Portable Tpm Based User Attestation Architecture for Cloud Environments
5. The verifier verifies the correctness of 𝕊𝕊3
∶= �𝒟𝒟,𝑃𝑃, 𝑧𝑧3,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒 ,𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 ,𝐶𝐶1,𝐸𝐸1 …𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚2 ,𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚3 ,𝐹𝐹� based on 
𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = �𝒟𝒟1,𝑃𝑃1 , …𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚3 �. It takes the following steps:
i. The verifier verifies that
𝐶𝐶,𝐸𝐸 ∈ 〈𝑎𝑎〉, 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒 ,𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝔸𝔸𝑣𝑣
 
 
 
  
  
ii.
 
The verifier computes
 
𝑃𝑃� ∶= 𝑃𝑃−𝑧𝑧3𝒟𝒟𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢
 
?̂?𝐶 ∶= 𝐶𝐶−𝑧𝑧3𝒟𝒟𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢, 
 
𝐹𝐹�
∶= 𝐹𝐹−𝑧𝑧3𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢
 
6.
 
If all the verifications succeed, the verifier outputs 
succeed, otherwise outputs fail.
 
iii.
 
Blacklist
 
There are three sub lists in the blacklist:𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 , 
𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , and𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 . Initially,
 
𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣
 
and
 
𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
 
are set to beempty, 
and
 
𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝
 
is set to be {𝒟𝒟𝐼𝐼} , where 
𝒟𝒟𝐼𝐼 ≡ 𝑇𝑇𝑢𝑢 (𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼)𝑢𝑢−1 𝑣𝑣�
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢
 
and 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒
 
is the cloud 
provider’s basename.There are three ways to blacklist a 
cloud user. Firstly, when a user is compromised and his 
private key(𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞)
 
has been exposed (e.g., on the 
Internet orembedded into some software), the 
blacklisting controller verifies the correctness of this 
exposed
 
key by checking
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞 ≡ 𝐴𝐴
 
(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀), then 
adds 𝑚𝑚to 𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 . 
Secondly, when a verifier interacts with some 
compromised authenticator and finds the authenticator 
suspicious, the verifier
 
reports the authenticator’s
 
signature𝕊𝕊 ∶= (𝕊𝕊1,𝕊𝕊2,𝕊𝕊3)
 
alongwith some other physical 
evidences to the blacklisting controller. After the 
blacklisting controllerverifies
 
the evidences and 
correctness of 𝕊𝕊1 , he adds (𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄)
 
in 𝕊𝕊1
 
to 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 . Then 
finally, when the cloud provider wants
 
to blacklist a 
cloud user (e.g., because that user leaves the group), 
the cloud provider sends (𝑃𝑃,𝐶𝐶,Θ)
 
to the blacklisting 
controller, where the (𝑃𝑃,𝐶𝐶,Θ)
 
tuple was obtained from 
the to-be- blacklisted user during the register protocol. 
The blacklisting controller verifies that correctness of 
Θand then adds 𝑃𝑃
 
to cloud provider blacklist 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 . 
When the blacklisting controller renounces a 
user based on the signature of the user, it needs to 
make sure that the signature is valid. That is, the 
signature was signed by a group member.
 
This is to 
prevent a malicious verifier fromadding arbitrary(𝒟𝒟,𝑃𝑃)
 
pair to𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 . Similarly, when the blacklisting controller 
revokes a user based on (𝑃𝑃,𝐶𝐶,Θ)
 
fromthe cloud 
provider, he needs to make sure that Θ
 
is a correct 
signature of knowledge. This is to prevent the 
(malicious) cloud provider from adding arbitrary 𝑃𝑃
 
to𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 . 
Observe that,
 
the
 
cloud provider can always add new
members, create new
 
signatures, and later revoke the 
members that he created
 
by herself. However, even 
though the malicious cloud provider can choose 𝑃𝑃
 
of his 
choice, he has to know log𝒟𝒟 𝑃𝑃
 
in order to create a valid 
signature 𝕊𝕊
 
or know log𝒟𝒟𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃
 
to create a valid Θ.This is a 
requirement in our security proof.
 
After the blacklisting 
controller publishes the blacklist 𝑉𝑉and signs using his 
private key𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺
−1 , everyone can verifythe authenticity of 
this blacklist using the blacklisting controller’s public key 
𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 . In practice, we may assume that
 
the blacklisting 
controller is trusted. Then, the verifiers
 
trust
 
the
 
blacklisting controller to construct the blacklist in a
 
correct manner. In the model where the blacklisting 
controller is not completely trusted, the blacklisting 
controller also needs
 
to publish a compromised private 
key for each item in
 
𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 , a signature for each item 
in
 
𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , and a
 
(𝑃𝑃,𝐶𝐶,Θ)
 
tuple for each element in
 
𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 . The 
verifiers have to
 
verify the correctness of each element in 
the blacklist
 
in
 
the same way as the blacklisting 
controller does. We show that
 
that even if the 
blacklisting controller or the cloud provider has been 
corrupted by the adversary, the anonymity of the honest 
users is still guaranteed.
 
The initialize and register have the same 
performance as in the cryptographic protocol scheme. 
The cost of membership approval protocol has four 
parts: proof of knowledge of a membership
 
private key, 
verification that the private key is not in
 
𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 , proof that 
the private key does not appear in 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ,and proof that 
the private key does not appear in𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 . The first part of 
the membership approval protocol is the
 
same as the 
cryptographic protocol scheme and takes constant time 
for both
 
the
 
authenticator and verifier. The second part 
is also the same as the cryptographic protocol scheme 
and takes 𝑚𝑚1 modular exponentiations for the verifier, 
where 𝑚𝑚1
 
is the size of 𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 . The third andfourth parts 
together take about 6𝑚𝑚2 + 2𝑚𝑚3 + 𝑧𝑧
 
modul
 
are
 
xponentiations for both the authenticator and verifier, 
where 𝑚𝑚2
 
and 𝑚𝑚3
 
are the lengths of 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
 
and 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 , 
respectively, and 𝑧𝑧
 
is a small constant.Observe that the 
cost of membership approval is linear to
 
the size of the 
blacklist and could be quite expensive if
 
the
 
blacklist 
becomes large. There are two possible
 
ways to control 
the size of the blacklist. First, divide into smaller groups. 
If the group size is too big, the blacklist may become 
large as well. One way is to control the size of the 
blacklist is to have multiple smaller groups. If a group 
size was 10,000, and at most two percent of the users 
would get blacklisted, then the blacklist would have at 
most 200 items. The drawback of this method is that the 
verifier needs to know which group the authenticator is 
in, thus, learns more information about the authenticator. 
It is a trade-off between privacy and performance.
 
Second, issue a new group if the blacklist 
grows too big. If the size of the blacklist is above certain 
threshold (e.g., two percent of the group size), then the 
cloud provider can do a rekey process as follows: The 
cloud provider first creates a new group. Then, each 
user in the old group proves to the cloud provider that 
he is a legitimate member of the old group and has not 
been blacklisted, then obtains a new membership 
private key for the new group.
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f) Membership approval for Resource-Constrained 
Devices
If the authenticator is a resource-constrained 
device, such as a TPM, a smart card, or a secure 
coprocessor; it can outsource part of the signing 
operation to a semi trusted host. Essentially, the signing 
 
 
 
 
  
operation is split between a computationally weak
 
device (denoted as the principal authenticator) and a 
resource a bundant
 
but less-trusted host. Observe that if 
the host does
 
not cooperate, then it is a denial of 
service. Thus, the host
 
platform is trusted for performing 
its portion of computation
 
correctly. However, the host is 
not allowed to learn the
 
private key of the authenticator 
or to forge a signature without the
 
principal
 
authenticator’s involvement. This model is used in the
 
original
 
cryptographic protocol scheme
 
with a concrete 
security model.
 
For our scheme, the same technique from can 
be applied.
 
Let (𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚,𝑞𝑞)
 
be the principal 
authenticator’s private key. The
 
principal
 
authenticator 
sends (𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖)
 
to the host but keeps(𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞). The signing 
operation in the membership approval can be 
conducted as follows:
 
1.
 
The
 
principal
 
authenticator picks a random𝒟𝒟 ← 〈𝑎𝑎〉
 
and computes 𝑃𝑃 ≡ 𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢)
 
2.
 
The principal authenticator sends (𝒟𝒟,𝑃𝑃)
 
to the host.
 
3.
 
The host randomly chooses two integers 𝕆𝕆,𝜇𝜇 ←{0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀+𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃
 
and computes
 
ℙ1 ∶= 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝕆𝕆
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀, 
 
ℙ2 ∶= 𝑠𝑠𝕆𝕆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠′ )𝜇𝜇
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀
 
4.
 
The principal authenticator and the host jointly 
produce a signature of knowledge that ℙ1
 
and ℙ2
 
are commitments to (𝑅𝑅, 𝑖𝑖)
 
and 𝑃𝑃
 
was computed 
using the authenticator’s secret 𝑚𝑚 . That is, they 
compute the signature of knowledge
 
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃�𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞, 𝑖𝑖,𝕆𝕆, 𝜇𝜇, 𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇 ∶ 𝐴𝐴
≡
 
ℙ1𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀) ∧ ℙ2
≡
 
𝑠𝑠𝕆𝕆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠′)𝜇𝜇 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀) ∧ 1
≡ ℙ2−𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠′)𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀) ∧ 𝑃𝑃
≡ 𝒟𝒟𝑚𝑚 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢) ∧𝑚𝑚
∈ (0,1)𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 +𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 +1 ∧ (𝑖𝑖 − 2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)
∈ {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′ +𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 +1��𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞 ∥ 𝑠𝑠�
 
(13) 
With the following steps:
 
a.
 
The principal authenticator chooses a random 
integers 
 
𝜇𝜇𝑞𝑞 ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞+𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 ,  𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚 ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚+𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓
 
And computes 
 
ℙ�1𝓅𝓅 ∶= 𝐺𝐺𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚 𝑄𝑄𝜇𝜇𝑞𝑞 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀)  𝑃𝑃� ∶= 𝒟𝒟𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢
 
And sends ℙ�1𝓅𝓅
 
and 𝑃𝑃�
 
to the host.
 
b.
 
The host picks random integers
 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′ +𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 ,   𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 +1
 
𝜇𝜇𝕆𝕆,𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀+2𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 , 
 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆 , 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇 ← {0,1}2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀+2𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃+𝑝𝑝𝜓𝜓 +1
 
c.
 
The host computes
 
ℙ�1 ∶= ℙ�1𝓅𝓅ℙ1𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀)
 
ℙ�2 ∶= 𝑠𝑠𝜇𝜇𝕆𝕆𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠′)𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀)
 
ℙ�3 ∶= ℙ2−𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠′)𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑀𝑀)𝑃𝑃� ∶= 𝒟𝒟𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑢𝑢
 
d.
 
The
 
host computes
 
𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 ∶= 𝜓𝜓�𝑀𝑀 ∥ 𝑠𝑠′ ∥ 𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑡𝑡 ∥ 𝐺𝐺 ∥ 𝑄𝑄 ∥ 𝐴𝐴 ∥ 𝑢𝑢 ∥ 𝑣𝑣 ∥ 𝑎𝑎 ∥ 𝒟𝒟 ∥ 𝑃𝑃
∥ ℙ1 ∥ ℙ2 ∥ ℙ1� ∥ ℙ2� ∥ ℙ3� ∥ 𝑃𝑃� ∥ 𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞 �
 
and sends𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
 
to the principal authenticator.
 
e.
 
The principal authenticator chooses a random 
𝑙𝑙ℙ ← {0,1}𝑝𝑝𝜃𝜃
 
and computes
 
𝑧𝑧1 ∶= 𝜓𝜓(𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 ∥ 𝑙𝑙ℙ ∥ 𝑠𝑠)
 
And sends 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
 
and 𝑙𝑙ℙ
 
to the host
 
f.
 
The
 
principal authenticator computes (over the 
integers)
 
𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞 ∶= 𝜇𝜇𝑞𝑞 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝑞𝑞, 
 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 ∶= 𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝑚𝑚
 
And sends 𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞
 
and 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚
 
to the host
 
g.
 
The host computes
 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∶= 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ (𝑖𝑖 − 2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖), 
 
𝑏𝑏𝜇𝜇 ∶= 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝜇𝜇, 
 
𝑏𝑏𝕆𝕆
∶= 𝜇𝜇𝕆𝕆 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝕆𝕆, 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆 ∶= 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝕆𝕆 ∙ 𝑖𝑖, 
 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∶= 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝑖𝑖2, 
 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇
∶= 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇 + 𝑧𝑧1 ∙ 𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝜇𝜇
 
h.
 
The host sets
 
𝕊𝕊1 = �𝒟𝒟,𝑃𝑃,ℙ1,ℙ2, 𝑧𝑧1, 𝑙𝑙ℙ ,𝑏𝑏𝑞𝑞 ,𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 ,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ,𝑏𝑏𝜇𝜇 ,𝑏𝑏𝕆𝕆,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝕆𝕆 ,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇 �
 
5.
 
The principal authenticator produces a signature of 
knowledge that his private key has not been 
blacklisted in
 
𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
 
and 𝑉𝑉𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝 , the same as in the sign 
algorithm.
 
Note that the verification operation in the 
membership approval protocol will change slightly to be 
consistent
 
with the signing operation. More specifically, 
the verifier
 
now verifies
 
𝑧𝑧1 ∶= 𝜓𝜓�𝜓𝜓�𝑀𝑀 ∥ 𝑠𝑠′ ∥ 𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑡𝑡 ∥ 𝐺𝐺 ∥ 𝑄𝑄 ∥ 𝐴𝐴 ∥ 𝑢𝑢 ∥ 𝑣𝑣 ∥ 𝑎𝑎 ∥ 𝒟𝒟 ∥ 𝑃𝑃
∥ ℙ1 ∥ ℙ2 ∥ ℙ1� ∥ ℙ2� ∥ ℙ3� ∥ 𝑃𝑃� ∥ 𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞� ∥ 𝑙𝑙ℙ
∥ 𝑠𝑠�
 
Also note that the steps 3 and 4 cannot be 
outsourced to the
 
host, because the host does not know 
the 𝑚𝑚
 
value. As we shall discuss in the following 
Section, for implementing our scheme intamper-
resistant hardware devices, the blacklists (𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 , 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , 
𝑉𝑉𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝 ) expect to be very small, asthese blacklists only 
grow when there are physical
 
attacks on these devices.
 
g)
 
Using TPM Hardware
 
We could have the following benefits using the 
TPM hardware: 1) less computational
 
work for trusted 
hardware device, 2) portability and 3) more efficient 
blacklist
 
mechanism.
 
The main design principle is that 
the host and the
 
hardware jointly perform the 
© 2015   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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membership approval as the authenticator. The host, if 
corrupted, could break the anonymity of the user but 
cannot get to know the user’s membership private key. 
Because in any case, the host can pad some identifier 
to each message sent by the hardware device. Another 
advantage of using trusted hardware device is to have 
more efficient blacklist. Thus, a user is blacklisted in the 
following cases. The user’s membership private key was 
    
removed
 
from the trusted hardware device, and was 
published
 
widely so that everyone knows this 
compromised
 
private key, it’s been blacklisted. When 
the user’s membership private key was extracted
 
from 
the trusted hardware device by the adversary.
 
The
 
cloud 
provider suspects that the user’s hardware device
 
was 
compromised, but has not obtained the user’
 
sprivate 
key. Thus, blacklisted. The user’s membership private 
key was extracted
 
from the hardware device by the 
adversary. The blacklisting controller suspects that the 
hardware
 
device was corrupted. The blacklisting 
controller obtains a signature from the corrupted device 
but
 
has not obtained the private key becomes 
blacklisted.
 
The
 
cloud provider
 
blacklists the user for 
some management
 
reason, e.g., the user’s membership 
expired.
 
The user is blacklisted from transactions, more 
specifically the user abuses his group privilege and is 
blacklisted by the blacklisting controller after the user
 
conducted a membership approval.
 
IV.
 
Experimental Study
 
 
The portable TPM based user attestation 
architecture for cloud environments
 
model has been 
developed for highly authenticated and secured cloud 
computing environment. The system model presented 
has been developed on Visual Studio 2012 framework 
4.0 with C#. The overall system has been developed 
and implemented with Microsoft Windows Azure 
platform.
 
We mainly focused on data leakages that can 
occur in the cloud environment. Portable TPM based 
user attestation architecture supports hardware-based 
key management
 
by using TPM devices to provide 
better
 
security and hence device portability is attained. 
Therefore, a user can access to cloud storage’s
 
contents in secure environment and securely store user
 
data to the remote cloud server using this portable 
devices which provides added security.
 
The developed system has been simulated on 
live Microsoft Windows Azure cloud for different 
performance parameters like cloud memory utilization, 
user attestation overhead and the 𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠
 
perspective for 
CPU utilization. The relative study for these all factors 
has been performed. This system or model performance 
has been verified for various user size with the assigned 
authentication devices and the effectiveness as well as 
performance parameters have been checked for its 
robustness justification.
 
 
Figure 1 :  Cloud Memory Utilization 
The above mentioned figure (Figure 1) depicts 
the cloud memory utilization in megabytes based on the 
respective set of cloud users from 10 to 50. Here, the 
memory utilization is computed based on the user which 
is able to access the cloud service through his 
credentials along with the additional authenticated 
device, TPM. Usually for users to access cloud, cloud 
providers may be concerned about the memory 
utilization of varied users. From the graph, it can be 
justified that not much memory is utilized with the 
additional security parameter. It clearly shows that even 
though the cloud users are 50, the cloud memory 
utilization is not differing much. Thus, memory 
computation is highly adaptive. 
 
Figure 2 :  User Attestation Overhead 
Based on the simulated data, the graph (Figure 
2) is plotted making the comparison of the user 
attestation overhead of our proposed system with 
portable TPM device against the user attestation without 
TPM. The computation overheads with and without TPM 
[18] is being evaluated in milliseconds. Without the 
external device it is obvious that the computation is of 
less value. Therefore, from the figure it is evaluated that 
the average computation overhead without the TPM 
device (without added security) is 5.58ms. The average 
computation overhead with the usage of TPM which 
provides additional security is evaluated to be 6.35ms. 
© 2015   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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-
Thus, the average computational overhead increase is 
≈ 13𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠  which is very negligible when considering a 
highly secure cloud environment with the cryptographic 
protocols. 
 
Figure 3 : Average Cloud CPU Utilization 
There must be the processing time of the virtual 
machines considered when accessing the cloud 
services. The average cloud CPU utilization is been 
depicted in milliseconds which is plotted in the above 
graph. For every user interaction with the cloud services, 
the CPU is utilized. Here, users are accessing the cloud 
with the portable TPM devices and the average cloud 
CPU utilization is plotted. As the users increase from 10 
to 50, the processing time also increases. The average 
utilization of the CPU is found to be ≈ 35𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠. 
Therefore from these results, we have 
established that the proposed model can be an 
effective, secure and optimum adaptable approach for 
portable TPM based user attestation architecture for 
cloud environment. 
V. Conclusion 
There is a growing demand for sharing data 
with a large number of consumers using the Cloud. One 
of the main issues with data sharing in such 
environments is the privacy and security of information. 
In particular, the issue of preserving confidentiality of the 
cloud data and also the need to keep the credentials 
while respecting the policies set out by the cloud 
provider. We mainly focused on data leakages that can 
occur in either client-side or server-side [17]. In this 
paper we have proposed novel property based 
attestation techniques for the cloud. We have designed 
a hardware based device which is portable for further 
security. We propose a portable device which is used in 
the authentication and veriﬁcation of the cloud user. We 
have discussed our secure data sharing protocol, which 
allows highly conﬁdential data sharing. The portable 
TPM based user attestation architecture for cloud 
environments model exploits client-side authentication 
with encryption technique to mitigate server-side data 
leakages such as malicious insider attack or exploiting 
vulnerabilities of server platform. Due to remote 
attestation protocol for verifying the client, we ensure 
that malicious behaviors cannot occur. Therefore, a user 
can access to cloud storage’s contents in secure mobile 
environment and store user data to the remote server in 
encrypted form using securely created and managed 
data encryption key. We also developed a set of security 
models such as public key cryptographic protocols and 
carried out a security analysis on our protocol. 
Asp.Net MVC is lightweight, provide full control 
over mark-up and support many features that allow fast 
& agile development. Hence it is best for developing 
interactive web application with latest web standards. 
Thus, our future work we will aim to improve the 
performance of our protocol based on the Asp.Net MVC 
Cloud architecture and thus providing security for SaaS 
cloud with the help of the portable TPM which will be 
feasible for the cloud users. 
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